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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Circuit is one of a minority of courts in the United
States which treats likelihood of confusion in trademark cases as a
question of law subject to de novo review instead of a question of fact
subject to "dearly erroneous" review.' The Federal Circuit's posi-
tion on this issue is problematic in part because of the appellate ju-
risdiction which, by statute, it shares with other courts over
trademark cases from the United States Patent and Trademark Of-
fice (PTO).2 The Federal Circuit's de novo review of likelihood of
* Partner, Cushman, Darby & Cushman, Washington, D.C.; Member, California and
District of Columbia bars. B.A., Connecticut College, 1975; J.D., University of Maryland,
1980). The author thanks Joon Park for research assistance.
1. Likelihood of confusion exists if the relevant public is likely to believe that defend-
ant's product or service emanates from plaintiff (source confusion) or that plaintiff and de-
fendant are affiliated or that plaintiff sponsors or approves defendant or its products or
services. Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, 748 F.2d 556, 558-59, 224 U.S.P.Q. 128, 130
(10th Cir. 1984) (examining likelihood of confusion between gasoline service station services
and snow cone stand services).
2. Parties dissatisfied with decisions of the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks or
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confusion also needs to be reconciled with its own application of the
clearly erroneous standard to several other important trademark law
issues.
I. REVIEW OF LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION AMONG
THE CIRCUIT COURTS
All the circuit courts decide likelihood of confusion issues based
on multi-factor tests.3 The factors vary somewhat depending on the
circuit and the particular panel, but generally the courts consider, at
a minimum: (1) the strength of plaintiff's mark; (2) the similarity of
the parties' respective marks; (3) the similarities of the products or
services; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) degree of purchaser
care; and (6) the defendant's intent.
No one list is exclusive, and not all factors are always relevant or
entitled to equal weight. The criteria are generally weighed and bal-
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board of the PTO may appeal to the Federal Circuit or pursue a
civil action in any district court with jurisdiction. 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (1988).
3. The circuits utilize the following multi-factor tests. Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan,
867 F.2d 22, 29, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1690, 1695-96 (1st Cir. 1989) (similarity of marks, similarity of
goods, channels of trade, advertising, purehasers, actual confusion, intent, and strength of
plaintiff's mark); Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 75, 8 U.S.P.OJ2d 1345,
1350-52 (2d Cir. 1988) (strength of plaintiff's mark, similarity of marks, proximity of prod-
ucts, "bridging the gap," actual confusion, good faith, quality of defendant's product, and
sophistication of buyers); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229,
200 U.S.P.Q. 421, 425 (3d Cir. 1978) (similarity of marks, strength of owner's mark, price of
product and purchaser care, actual confusion vet non, intent, channels of trade, targeted cus-
tomers, relationship of goods, and consumer expectation); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747
F.2d 1522, 1527, 224 U.S.P.Q. 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1984) (strength of mark, similarity of marks,
similarity of goods and services, similarity of facilities of the parties, similarity of advertising,
intent, and actual confusion); Marathon Mfg. v. Enerlite Prods., 767 F.2d 214, 217, 226
U.S.P.Q. 836, 837 (5th Cir. 1985) (type of mark, similarity of design, similarity of product,
retail outlets and purchasers, advertising media, intent, and actual confusion); Frisch's Res-
taurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648, 214 U.S.P.Q 15, 19-
20 (6th Cir. 1982) (strength of mark, relatedness of goods, similarity of marks, actual confu-
sion, marketing channels, purchaser care, intent, and likelihood of expansion of product
lines), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d
1176, 1185, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1008 (7th Cir. 1989) (type of mark, similarity of design,
similarity of products, identity of retail outlets and purchasers, identity of advertising media,
intent, and actual confusion); Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091, 207 U.S.P.OJ
897, 900 (8th Cir. 1980) (strength of mark, similarity of marks, relationship of products, in-
tent, actual confusion, and cost and conditions of purchase); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats,
599 F.2d 341, 348-49, 204 U.S.P.Q. 808, 814 (9th Cir. 1979) (strength, proximity of goods,
similarity of marks, actual confusion, marketing channels, type of goods and degree of pur-
chaser care, intent, and likelihood of expansion); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co.,
805 F.2d 920, 925, 231 U.S.P.Q. 913, 915-16 (10th Cir. 1986) (degree of similarity, intent,
relation of products in use and manner of marketing, and degree of purchaser care); Wesco
Mfg. v. Tropical Attractions of Palm Beach, Inc., 833 F.2d 1484, 1488, 5 U.S.P.Q2d 1190,
1193-94 (11 th Cir. 1987) (nature of plaintiff's mark, similarity of mark, similarity of products,
similarity of retail outlets and customers, advertising, intent, and actual confusion); American
Ass'n for the Advancement of Science v. Hearst Corp., 498 F. Supp. 244, 259, 206 U.S.P.OJ
605, 618 (D.D.C. 1980) (actual confusion, similarity of mark, competitiveness of products,
purchaser, purchaser care, and intent).
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anced, with no single factor being decisive. The factors "imply no
mathematical precision," and a plaintiff need not establish all or
even most of the factors to prevail.4 The Federal Circuit follows its
predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA), in recognizing thirteen factors to be considered in likeli-
hood of confusion cases, including most of those enumerated
above.5 The Federal Circuit has generally taken CCPA decisions to
be binding precedent.6
While all the circuits employ the same basic test of likelihood of
confusion, there is a lopsided split among them on the standard of
review for likelihood of confusion cases. As the result of move-
ments in the 1980s, likelihood of confusion is treated as a question
of fact subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review in the First, 7
Third,8  Fourth,9  Fifth,' 0  Seventh," Eighth, 12  Ninth,'8
4. Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1186, 5 U.S.P.O_2d 1944, 1946 (6th Cir.
1988) (discussing role of multi-factor tests in trademark decisionmaking).
5. Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1569, 218 U.S.P.Q.
390, 393-94 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361,
177 U.S.P.Q. 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)) (listing factors of: similarity of marks, similarity of
goods, trade channels, buyers and conditions of sale, fame of prior mark, third party uses,
actual confusion vel non, length of concurrent use without confusion, variety of goods on
which mark is used, market interface between parties, exclusivity of right of applicant, extent
of potential confusion, and other probative facts). Du Pont does not expressly list "intent",
but the Federal Circuit will consider it. See The University of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C.
Gourmet Foods Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376, 217 U.S.P.Q. 505, 508 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(noting that intent may be relevant).
6. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370, 215 U.S.P.Q. 657, 658 (Fed. Cir.
1982) (adopting prior decisions of CCPA as precedent).
7. Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 377, 207 U.S.P.Q. 465, 474-75
(1st Cir. 1980) (describing clearly erroneous standard as more generous toward trial court's
findings than de novo review).
8. American Home Prods. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 370, 5 U.S.P.QJ2d 1073,
1075 (3d Cir. 1987) (recognizing that trial courts are better situated to evaluate likelihood of
confusion).
9. Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1526, 224 U.S.P.Q. 185, 187 (4th Cir.
1984) (adopting clearly erroneous standard and cautioning that such standard will not protect
against misapplication of law).
10. Marathon Mfg. v. Enerlite Prods., 767 F.2d 214, 217,226 U.S.P.Q. 836,837 (5th Cir.
1985) (rejecting de novo review used by "some" other circuits).
11. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1428-29, 227 U.S.P.Q. 138,
141 (7th Cir. 1985) (declaring that de novo review creates duplication of efforts), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1147 (1986).
12. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397,398-99,5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1314, 1315-
16 (8th Cir. 1987) (categorizing likelihood of confusion question as fact and identifying ap-
peals court's role as determining whether lower court's finding was sufficiently supported in
record), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988).
13. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1355, 228 U.S.P.Q. 346, 348
(9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (labeling likelihood of confusion as mixed question predominantly.
factual in nature and so subject to clearly erroneous review).
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Tenth, 14 Eleventh,15 and District of Columbia1 6 Circuits. The Sec-
ond, 17 Sixth,18 and Federal 19 Circuits treat likelihood of confusion
as a mixed question of law and fact, with the ultimate determination
of likelihood of confusion as a question of law subject to de novo
review.
In the majority of circuits, therefore, "[t]he court evaluates and
weighs these subsidiary findings to determine, as a matter of fact,
whether consumers are likely to [be] confuse[d]." 20 The minority of
circuits apply the clearly erroneous standard to review the trial
court's factual findings on the factors used to decide the ultimate
issue of the likelihood of confusion. 21 Those circuits review de novo
the legal question, "whether, given the foundational facts as found
by the lower court, those facts constitute a 'likelihood of
confusion.' "22
In one of the Federal Circuit's earliest opinions on likelihood of
confusion after it was created in 1982,23 the Federal Circuit followed
the CCPA rule that "the issue of likelihood of confusion is the ulti-
mate conclusion of law to be decided by the court, and .. . the
clearly erroneous rule is not applicable."' 24 Unlike other larger and
14. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 925, 231 U.S.P.Q 913, 918
(10th Cir. 1988) (disagreeing with circuits that use de novo review to decide likelihood of
confusion).
15. Wesco Mfg. v. Tropical Attractions of Palm Beach, Inc., 833 F.2d 1484, 1488 n.6, 5
U.S.P.Q.2d 1190, 1193 n.6 (11 th Cir. 1987) (noting trial court's findings of fact in likelihood
of confusion left undisturbed unless clearly erroneous).
16. Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 804, 3 U.S.P.Q2d
1276, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (emphasizing that deference should be shown to trial court's
findings).
17. Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 75-76, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1345, 1350 (2d
Cir. 1988) (noting ultimate determination of confusion is subject to de novo review while indi-
vidual findings subject to clearly erroneous standard). But see DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fan-
tasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 26, 217 U.S.P.Q. 307, 308 (2d Cir. 1982) (emphasizing that likelihood
of confusion is question of fact and often inappropriate for summary judgment); see also Com-
ment, Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd: G.I. Joe Emerges From Trademark Wars Victorious but Second
Circuit Continues Search For Appropriate Scope of Review, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 97, 103-08 (1988)
(discussing appellate review in likelihood of confusion context).
18. Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 651,
214 U.S.P.Q. 15, 20 (6th Cir.) (recognizing that each factor presents question of fact but that
determination from factors is question of law), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982).
19. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Circuit treatment).
20. Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Georgia, Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 840, 222 U.S.P.Q 10,
17 (11 th Cir. 1983) (noting analysis goes beyond merely tallying factors for and against deter-
mination of confusion).
21. See supra notes 17-19 (providing minority circuits' positions); see also Wynn Oil Co. v.
Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1186, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1944, 1946 (6th Cir. 1988) (describing approach
as mixed question of fact and law).
22. Wynn Oil, 839 F.2d at 1186, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1946.
23. Congress created the Federal Circuit with the passage of the Federal Courts Im-
provement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C. (1988)).
24. Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1569, 218 U.S.P.QO
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less centralized circuits, the Federal Circuit consistently, although
without explanation, reiterates its standard of review.2 5 The Federal
Circuit of course does apply the dearly erroneous standard to the
factual findings analyzed to determine likelihood of confusion.2 6
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THE 1980s
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court addressed the proper
appellate standard of review in a trademark case and provided gui-
dance applicable to likelihood of confusion cases. 27 Reversing the
Second Circuit's application of de novo review, the Supreme Court
stated: "[a]n appellate court cannot substitute its interpretation of
the evidence for that of the trial court simply because the reviewing
court 'might give the facts another construction, resolve the ambi-
guities differently, and find a more sinister cast to actions which the
District Court apparently deemed innocent.' "28 The Court rea-
soned that the trier of fact is better situated to determine the weight
and credibility of the evidence than is the reviewing court.29
Also in 1982, the Sixth Circuit, in one of its most significant trade-
mark cases, Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville,
Inc. ,3o adopted the then current Ninth Circuit approach. 3 1 This con-
sisted of applying a dearly erroneous standard to review the founda-
tional facts and de novo review of the legal conclusion drawn from
the foundational facts. 32 Justice White dissented from the denial of
certiorari on Frisch's Restaurants, on the grounds of the divergence of
the circuits' standards of review.33 The Ninth Circuit, on which the
390, 394 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that CCPA did not consider itself bound by narrow stan-
dard of review).
25. See, e.g., In re Electrolyte Laboratories, Inc., 913 F.2d 930, 932, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1239,
1240 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (labeling likelihood of confusion as question of law, although subjective
and based on particular facts); G.H. Mumm & Cie v. Desnoes & Geddes, Ltd., 917 F.2d 1292,
1295, 16 U.S.P.Q2d 1635, 1637 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating explicitly that likelihood of confu-
sion is question of law); Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enters. Inc., 889 F.2d 1070, 1072, 12
U.S.P.Q2d 1901, 1902 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (describing likelihood of confusion as legal issue).
26. Specialty Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distrib., 748 F.2d 669, 671, 223 U.S.P.Q. 1281,
1282 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (discussing interplay of factual and legal conclusions); Stock Pot Res-
taurant, Inc. v. Stockpot, Inc., 737 F.2d 1576, 1578, 222 U.S.P.Q 665, 666 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(noting that lower tribunal's subsidiary factual findings will be accepted unless they are clearly
wrong).
27. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 214 U.S.P.Q. 1
(1982) (dealing with alleged mislabeling by generic drug manufacturers).
28. lId at 858-59, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 7.
29. Id. at 856, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 6.
30. 670 F.2d 642, 214 U.S.P.Q. 15 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982).
31. Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 651,
214 U.S.P.Q. 15, 22 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982).
32. Id. (citing Alpha Indus., Inc. v. Alpha Steel Tube & Shapes, Inc., 616 F.2d 440, 443-
44 (9th Cir. 1980)).
33. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc. v. Frisch's Restaurants, Inc., 459 U.S. 916 (1982)
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 40:1221
Sixth Circuit relied, has since deliberately overruled its own prece-
dent. In an en.banc decision in 1985, the Ninth Circuit declared that
"the clearly erroneous standard should be applied in reviewing a
trial court's determination concerning likelihood of confusion."34
In support of its decision, the Ninth Circuit stated that de novo re-
view requires a "significant diversion of appellate resources" and
that there was a reduced need for de novo review because of "the
limited precedential value of likelihood of confusion decisions." 35
A non-trademark 1982 Supreme Court case, Pullman-Standard v.
Swint, 36 again restricted the scope of review and has affected the
treatment of likelihood of confusion determinations by the circuit
courts. In Swint, the Court applied Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which allows a court to set aside factual findings
only if they are clearly erroneous, in a way that eliminated any dis-
tinction between the treatment of "subsidiary" and "ultimate"
facts.3 7 In 1984, the Fourth Circuit followed Swint and rejected any
distinction between "subsidiary" and "ultimate" findings in review-
ing the issue of likelihood of confusion. 8
In 1985, the Seventh Circuit, citing Swint, expressly disagreed
with the Federal Circuit on the scope of review question. In Scandia
Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc. 39 the Seventh Circuit first stated a flat
rule: "[T]he question of likelihood of confusion is all fact and no
law." 40 As for the Federal Circuit's treatment of likelihood of confu-
sion as an "ultimate" issue subject to de novo review, the Seventh
Circuit stated: "[a]lthough we should think carefully before dis-
agreeing with the views of the Federal Circuit, a specialist court on
questions concerning intellectual property, we will not change the
[clearly erroneous] standard" as mandated in Swint.41 The Seventh
Circuit pointed to a number of evils that would be avoided by limit-
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (classifying First, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits as
applying clearly erroneous standard and Second and Ninth Circuits as applying de novo
review).
34. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1355, 228 U.S.P.Q 346, 348
(9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (observing that with this decision Ninth Circuit is now in accord with
analogous principles from non-trademark fields).
35. Id. at 1355-56, 228 U.S.P.Q. at 348 (noting that likelihood of confusion raised no
constitutional issues and called for mostly factual tests).
36. 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (discussing standard of review in Title VII discrimination
context).
37. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982).
38. See Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1526, 224 U.S.P.Q, 185, 187 (4th
Cir. 1984) (noting that Supreme Court in Swint made distinction obsolete).
39. 772 F.2d 1423, 227 U.S.P.Q. 138 (7th Cir. 1985).
40. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1428, 227 U.S.P.Q 138, 141
(7th Cir. 1985) (finding no need to decide if mixed questions of fact and law are reviewed
under different standards), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147 (1986).
41. Id. at 1428, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 141 (concluding Federal Circuit inconsistent with
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ing the scope of review, including increased randomness of the judi-
cial process, duplication of the trial judge's efforts, scant benefit
from the additional strain on judicial resources, improper "arroga-
tion" of judicial power, undermining the district court's legitimacy
in the eyes of litigants, and increasing the number of appeals. 42
The Seventh Circuit in Scandia Down then applied the clearly errone-
ous standard and affirmed the trial court's finding of likelihood of
confusion.43 Basing its petition, in part, on the need to resolve the
split of circuits on the scope of review, the losing party sought certio-
rari, which the Supreme Court denied with Justice White again dis-
senting.44 In 1987, the Third Circuit followed the Seventh and held
that the differentiation between "ultimate" and "basic" facts in like-
lihood of confusion cases was "no longer tenable" in view of
Swint.4 5
III. APPELLATE REVIEW OF TRADEMARK TRIAL AND
APPEAL BOARD DECISIONS
Another facet of the conflict between the Federal Circuit 'and
other courts is their different treatment of appeals from the Trade-
mark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) of the PTO. The Federal Cir-
cuit has non-exclusive jurisdiction over TTAB appeals.46 In
deciding such cases, the Federal Circuit applies its own standard in
reviewing the record as transmitted from the TTAB.47 An unusual
statutory provision enables a party to a TTAB proceeding to force
an appeal out of the Federal Circuit by electing to file a civil action
Supreme Court in Swint, and observing that distinction between foundational and ultimate
facts has drifted in and out of appellate cases for years).
42. IcL at 1428-29, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 142 (quoting, in part, Advisory Committee notes on
1985 amendment of FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
43. I& (observing that trial judge's choice between two permissible views cannot be
clearly erroneous).
44. Euroquilt, Inc. v. Scandia Down Corp., 475 U.S. 1147, 1147, 229 U.S.P.Q. 560, 560
(1986) (WhiteJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (recognizing split among circuits). Soon
afterJustice White's dissent, the Eighth Circuit was faced with the task of choosing the appro-
priate standard of review. While the Eighth Circuit issued an unclear decision involving the
matter in August 1987, Life Technologies, Inc. v. Gibbco Scientific, Inc., 826 F.2d 775, 776, 3
U.S.P.Q.2d 1795, 1796 (8th Cir. 1987) (appearing to utilize clearly erroneous standard), sub-
sequent opinions revert to the clearly erroneous standard of one of the leading Eighth Circuit
trademark cases, Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091, 207 U.S.P.Q. 897, 900 (8th
Cir. 1980) (setting forth clearly erroneous standard). See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak,
836 F.2d 397, 399, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1315, 1316 (8th Cir. 1987) (following Squirtco); see also Hotel
Corp. v. Norlew Inc., 841 F.2d 214, 219, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1646, 1649 (8th Cir. 1988) (using
clearly erroneous standard).
45. See American Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 370 n.2, 5
U.S.P..2d 1073, 1075 n.2 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that amendments to Federal Rules and
Supreme Court undercut de novo review of likelihood of confusion appellate cases).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1) (1988).
47. Id. § 1071(a)(3).
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in an appropriate United States district court for review of the
TTAB decision rather than appeal to the Federal Circuit.48 Such
civil actions are confusingly said to offer trials de novo; some of the
reasons why this is a misnomer are discussed below. It is true, how-
ever, that it may be possible to offer new evidence in such proceed-
ings.49 In the event of a district court adverse decision, the case is
subsequently appealable to the United States court of appeals for
the particular district in which the civil action was tried.50
Depending on its needs, a party may prefer a review of the closed
record by the Federal Circuit or an opportunity to offer new evi-
dence to a district court. Another advantage of a civil action, or dis-
advantage, as one may see it, is that a district court will decide not
only the registrability of the mark,51 but may also exercise direct
injunctive power over the actual use of the mark and may award
damages, profits, costs, and attorney fees. 52 A Federal Circuit deci-
sion on the merits of a TTAB appeal would immediately affect only
registrability. The opportunity to consolidate all of the issues for
civil review by a district court to achieve judicial economy was a fac-
tor considered by Congress in framing the law.53
A party to an appeal from the TTAB may find itself in district
court facing not only a different record but also a different standard
of review than it would face in the Federal Circuit. While the Fed-
eral Circuit will exercise de novo review of the TTAB's decision on
the "ultimate" issue of likelihood of confusion, the majority of civil
review courts54 will accept the T-AB's finding "unless the contrary
is established by testimony which in, character and amount, carries
thorough conviction. " 55 The Federal Circuit itself has equated the
48. Id. § 1071(b)(1) (authorizing "person... dissatisfied with the decision of the Com-
missioner or Trademark Trial and Appeal Board... may... have remedy by a civil action.").
49. See Standard Oil Co. v. Osage Oil & Transp., Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q02d 1554, 1556 (N.D.
Okla. 1988) (noting that additional evidence may be presented by party when TTAB decision
is being reviewed by district court).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1121(a) (1988) (stating that "the courts of appeal of the United States
... shall have appellate jurisdiction, of all actions arising under this chapter").
51. Id. § 1119 (giving courts power "to determine the right to registration, order the
cancellation of registrations, in whole or in part, restore uncanceled registrations, and other-
wise rectify the register with respect to the registration of any party to the action").
52. Id. §§ 1114(1), 1116, 1117.
53. See 3J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE §§ 21(1)-21(75) (1990) (pro-
viding legislative history of 15 U.S.C. § 1071 which addresses congressional intent regarding,
inter alia, consolidation of issues in district court).
54. J. T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND-UNFAIR COMPETION § 21:5 (Supp. 1989).
55. Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120 (1984) (concluding that Patent Office decision re-
garding priority of invention can only be overturned if contrary is established by testimony
which in character and amount carries thorough conviction); see, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v.
Stagecoach Properties, Inc., 685 F.2d 302,306, 216 U.S.P.Q. 480, 483 (9th Cir. 1982) (follow-
ing Daniels determination); American Heritage Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3,
10, 182 U.S.P.Q. 77, 81 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying thorough conviction standard to infringe-
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thorough conviction standard with the dearly erroneous standard.56
The discrepancy in standards of review was discussed at length by
the First Circuit in Sarah Coventry, Inc. v. T. Sardelli & Sons, Inc.5 7 In
this case, the TTAB dismissed Coventry's opposition and Coventry
appealed to the CCPA. 58 The defendant elected to proceed with a
civil action in district court,59 which resulted in an affirmance of the
T'AB dismissal based on the "thorough conviction" standard of re-
view.60 Coventry's unsuccessful argument was as follows:
But for the defendant's action [electing civil review], the case
would have been heard by the [CCPA], which is comprised of ex-
perts in the area of trademarks ... ; [the CCPA] would have en-
gaged in a less deferential and far more open-ended review of the
[TTAB's] decision than that permitted the district court under the
"thorough conviction" test .... [F]or the district court to apply
such a restrictive test in these circumstances would dearly preju-
dice plaintiff's right of appeal .... [The TTAB is] very frequently
reversed ... simply on the basis of the [CCPA's] own independent
judgment of the question of whether the marks are confusingly
similar.6 1
The district court rejected Coventry's argument based on exten-
sive precedent requiring application of the "thorough conviction"
or "dear error" standard.6 2 The court acknowledged the pragmatic
appeal and ingenuity of Coventry's argument and the "sympathetic
note in its logic."16 3 The district court characterized the dichotomy
as to the standard of review as "quite understandable because the
judges of the [CCPA], being experts in the field, may indeed be bet-
ter equipped to reevaluate the entire record." 64 Despite this, the
district court held to the stricter standard of review. In affirming,
the First Circuit also acknowledged "some plausibility" to Coven-
ment and cancellation action with regard to service mark); Watkins Prods. v. Sunway Fruit
Prods., 311 F.2d 496, 498-99, 136 U.S.P.. 14, 16 (7th Cir. 1962) (stating PTO finding must
be accepted if it is consistent with evidence and cannot be overturned by mere preponderance
of evidence standard).'
56. See Fregeau v. Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d 1034, 1038, 227 U.S.P.Q. 848, 851 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (discussing similarity betweeen thorough conviction and clearly erroneous standards as
to applicant's burden of proof).
57. 392 F. Supp. 347, 185 U.S.P.Q. 617 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 526 F.2d 20, 188 U.S.P.Q. 657
(1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 920 (1976).
58. Sarah Coventry, Inc. v. T. Sardelli & Sons, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 347, 348, 185 U.S.P.Q.
617, 618 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 526 F.2d 20, 188 U.S.P.Q. 657 (lst Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
920 (1976).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 354, 185 U.S.P.Q. at 622-23.
61. Id. at 351, 185 U.S.P.Q. at 620-21 (emphasis in original).
62. Id. at 353-54, 185 U.S.P.Q. at 623.
63. Id. at 354, 185 U.S.P.Q. at 623.
64. Id. at 352, 185 U.S.P.Q. at 621.
1991] 1229
1230 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAw REvIEw[Vol. 40:1221
try's contention.65 However, just as the Seventh Circuit did in Scan-
dia Down,66 the acknowledgement of CCPA and Federal Circuit
"expertise" did not result in departure from the strict standard.
IV. IMPACT OF OTHER PRACTICES
Two other practices of the Federal Circuit suggest an implicit in-
consistency with its rule of de novo review of the issue of likelihood of
confusion. First, the Federal Circuit applies the clearly erroneous
standard to findings of secondary meaning, 67 genericness and de-
scriptiveness, 68 abandonment, 69 and functionality.70 These are ma-
jor issues in trademark law and are frequently encountered by the
TrAB and federal courts. Each involves consideration of multiple
factors of evidence, as does the likelihood of confusion issue. There
appears to be no articulated reason to treat these issues with a dif-
ferent standard of review.
Second, the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction over
appeals of patent cases, 71 applies its own precedent to the decision
of patent issues in order to fulfill its mandate of developing a consis-
tent jurisprudence and promoting a uniform application of patent
law.7 2 Where a patent case also involves pendant trademark issues,
however, the Federal Circuit will apply the trademark law of the cir-
cuit in which the case was tried "to avoid exacerbating the problem
of intercircuit conflicts in nonpatent areas" and to frustrate forum
shopping regarding non-patent claims.73 The exception is the issue
65. Sarah Coventry, Inc. v. T. Sardelli & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 20, 21, 188 U.S.P.Q 657,
658 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 920 (1976).
66. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (discussing Scandia Down in context of
standard of review).
67. See In re Loew's Theatres, Inc., 769 F.2d 764, 768, 226 U.S.P.Q. 865, 869 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (holding that PTO's finding that more than de minimis segment of population would
associate chewing tobacco with city of Durango could only be overturned if clearly
erroneous).
68. See In re Merrill Lynch, 828 F.2d 1567, 1571, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1141, 1144 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (finding failure of PTO to sustain its burden of showing that applicant's proposed
trademark was generic is clearly erroneous).
69. See Cerveceria Centroamericana, S.A. v. Cerveceria India, Inc., 892 F.2d 1021, 1024,
13 U.S.P.Q2d 1307, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (defining abandonment in terms of non-use and
intent).
70. See Cable Elec. Prods. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1030, 226 U.S.P.Q, 881,890-
91 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (applying clearly erroneous standard to overturn district court's ruling on
functionality due to its failure to look at evidence on nonfunctionality).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1988).
72. Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1438, 223 U.S.P.Q 1074, 1086
(Fed. Cir. 1984) ( I judge panel) (noting congressional intent that Federal Circuit only con-
tribute to uniformity of patent laws so as not to usurp district court's role).
73. Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 909, 223 U.S.P.Q 982,
986 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that trademark portion of case should be decided by law of
circuit in which case was tried).
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of likelihood of confusion which the Federal Circuit, accustomed to
the de novo standard of review, may review differently than the
originating circuit.
V. CASE STUDY: NINA RICCI VERSUS VITTORIO RICCI
Many of these tensions were exposed in Nina Ricci S.A.R.L. v.
E.T.F. Enterprises.74 There, the Federal Circuit ruled on a decade-
long conflict between the marks NINA RICCI and VITTORIO
RICCI in which the TTAB, the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, and the Federal Circuit all reached different con-
clusions on the subject of likelihood of confusion.75
In the first battle, decided in 1979, the TTAB sustained an oppo-
sition by Nina Ricci against the mark VITTORIO RICCI. 76 Nina
Ricci asserted prior use and registration of the marks NINA RICCI,
CAPRICCI, SIGNORICCI, MADEMOISELLE RICCI, and RICCI
for beauty aids and apparel. 77 The application to register VIT-
TORIO RICCI covered items of apparel, including belts and
shoes.78 After concluding that the respective goods of the parties
were "closely related if not identical,"' 79 the Board focused attention
on the "pivotal question" of the similarity of the marks.80 The ap-
plicant contended that "Ricci" was a common surname and not a
strong mark.8 ' The applicant further argued that comparison of the
marks, the feminine NINA RICCI and the masculine VITTORIO
RICCI, led to the conclusion of no likelihood of confusion. 2 The
Board, however, emphasized that the NINA RICCI mark and varia-
tions were strong due to their "long and extensive use and promo-
tion and the accompanying goodwill, fame and reputation."8 3 The
Board deemed the surname RICCI to be "the dominant and most
significant element" of Nina Ricci's RICCI combination marks.8 4 It
74. 889 F.2d 1070, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1901 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
75. Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enters., 203 U.S.P.Q. 947 (T.T.A.B. 1979) (finding
likelihood of confusion), rev'd, 523 F. Supp. 1147, 213 U.S.P.Q. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding
no likelihood of confusion). The Federal Circuit's 1989 decision was a connected case. Nina
Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enters., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1061 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (finding no likelihood of
confusion), rev'd, 889 F.2d 1070, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1901 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding likelihood of
confusion).
76. Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enters., 203 U.S.P.Q. 947 (T.T.A.B. 1979), rev'd, 523 F.
Supp. 1147, 213 U.S.P.Q. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
77. Id. at 947-48.
78. Id. at 950.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 950-51.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 952. Nina Ricci also proved large scale advertising expenditures and sales rev-
enues in connection with its RICCI marks. Id at 948.
84. Id.
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noted its 1962 decision sustaining Nina Ricci's opposition to the
mark RICCI OF HAYMAKER for apparel.8 5 In that decision, the
Board referred to the "common knowledge that various couturiers
... are frequently referred to by their surname alone."8 6 In sum, as
between VITTORIO RICCI and Nina Ricci's RICCI marks, the
Board in 1979 found that there was a likelihood that the marks
could be confused and refused to register VITORIO RICCI. 87
Instead of appealing to the CCPA, the VITTORIO RICCI appli-
cant commenced a civil action in the Southern District of New York
for de novo review of the TTAB's decision.88 Nina Ricci counter-
claimed for trademark infringement.8 9 The district court's 1981 de-
cision adopted the "thorough conviction" standard of review. The
court wrote that "thorough conviction" was the "prevailing" stan-
dard and applied the Second Circuit's multi-factor test for likeli-
hood of confusion.90 The district court determined that the TTAB
erred in refusing the registration of VITTORIO RICCI; ordered the
registration of that mark for belts and shoes, the only VITTORIO
RICCI apparel products actually on the market; and dismissed Nina
Ricci's infringement counterclaim. 9'
In reaching this decision the district court acknowledged that
NINA RICCI was a strong mark for perfumes but held that Nina
Ricci's other RICCI combination marks were weak and that NINA
RICCI did not use the mark RICCI alone.92 In discussing the "simi-
larity of marks" factor, the court noted that in the actual marketing
of the brands NINA RICCI and VITTORIO RICCI, the surname
was "invariably modified" by the respective given names.93 As for
the "proximity of products" factor, the court scrutinized the lists of
apparel items appearing in Nina Ricci's registrations and deter-
mined that Nina Ricci's products consisted primarily of fragrances;
Vittorio Ricci's products consisted primarily of footwear; Nina Ricci
had no plan to expand into footwear; both parties' products were
expensive and of high quality; and they were purchased typically by
85. Id. at 951 (citing Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. Haymaker Sports, Inc., 134 U.S.P.Q 26
(T.T.A.B. 1962), which held that there was likelihood of confusion as to NINA RICCI's and
RICCI OF HAYMAKER's marks).
86. Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. Haymaker Sports, Inc., 134 U.S.P.Q. 26, 28 (T.T.A.B. 1962).
87. Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enters., 203 U.S.P.Q. 947, 951-52 (T.T.A.B. 1979).
88. E.T.F. Enters. v. Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L., 523 F. Supp. 1147, 213 U.S.P.Q. 517 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
89. Id. at 1148-49, 213 U.S.P.Q. at 519.
90. Id. at 1156, 213 U.S.P.Q. at 524-25.
91. Id. at 1157, 213 U.S.P.Q. at 525.
92. Id. at 1154, 213 U.S.P.Q. at 523-24. The court found the TTAB's finding that the
defendant had a "RICCI" mark was clearly erroneous. Id. at 1156, 213 U.S.P.Q at 524.
93. Id. at 1154-55, 213 U.S.P.Q. at 524.
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careful, sophisticated buyers. 94
After its victory before the district court, the applicant applied
anew to register VITTORIO RICCI for the apparel items other than
belts and shoes, and Nina Ricci again opposed. This time, in 1988,
the Board found no likelihood of confusion and dismissed the oppo-
sition.95 The Board followed the district court's "guidance," 96 giv-
ing particular weight to the fact that the marks consisted of the
common surname "Ricci" prefixed with the respective first names
and noting two "negatives": there had been no actual confusion
and no showing of intent by applicant to capitalize on Nina Ricci's
goodwill. 97
Nina Ricci appealed to the Federal Circuit98 and the applicant did
not elect to transfer the case to the district court. In a 1989 deci-
sion, the Federal Circuit predictably treated the ultimate determina-
tion of likelihood of confusion as "a legal matter, based on the facts
properly found," 99 reversed the TTAB, and held that there was a
likelihood of confusion between the VITTORIO RICCI mark and
Nina Ricci's marks. 100 The Federal Circuit's reasoning was substan-
tially similar to the reasoning used by the Board to reach its decision
more than a decade before. 10' In the 1989 decision, the Federal
Circuit reversed the Board because it weighed the factors differ-
ently. The Federal Circuit reasoned "that the RICCI surname is a
unifying name" in Nina Ricci's marks, the surname is the "dominant
and significant part of [those] marks"; 10 2 and that the Nina Ricci
marks were strong due to their fame, promotion, and success.105
The Federal Circuit decided that the absence of actual confusion
was entitled to little or no weight because there had been little or no
opportunity for it to occur.10 4 No mention was made of the appli-
94. Id. at 1155-56, 213 U.S.P.Q. at 524-25.
95. Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enters., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1061, 1066 (T.T.A.B. 1988),
rev'd, 889 F.2d 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The Board found that collateral estoppel did not apply
since registrability as to the new apparel items had been left expressly undecided by the dis-
trict court. Id. at 1065. See E.T.F. Enters., 523 F. Supp. at 1156, 213 U.S.P.Q. at 525.
96. Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1065.
97. Id. at 1066.
98. Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enters., 889 F.2d 1070, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1901 (Fed. Cir.
1989); see Ford & Flick, Review of the 1989 Trademark Decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 1233, 1250 (1990) (discussing factors court considered in reaching
decision).
99. Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L., 889 F.2d at 1072, 12 U.S.P.O.2d at 1902.
100. Id. at 1074, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1904.
101. See Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enters., 203 U.S.P.Q. 947, 950-51 (T.T.A.B. 1979)
(discussing relationship between Ricci's surname and her mark).
102. Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L, 889 F.2d at 1073, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1903 (noting fashion indus-
try practice of using surname to identify product).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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cant's good faith, but the Federal Circuit did state that "there is no
excuse for even approaching the well-known trademark of a
competitor." 0 5
In sum, the district court reversed the 'ITAB's decision that found
likelihood of confusion, and the Federal Circuit reversed the
TTAB's decision that found no likelihood of confusion. The TTAB,
in its 1988 decision, deliberately acquiesced in the district court's
decision. The Federal Circuit, in effect, vindicated the Board's 1979
decision without any detailed analysis that distinguished or recon-
ciled the district court's intervening legal analysis or findings of
fact. 106
CONCLUSION
In light of the Supreme Court's rulings and the adoption of the
clearly erroneous standard by most circuits, the Federal Circuit
should articulate its reasons for adhering to the de novo standard
when reviewing likelihood of confusion cases. Is the Federal Circuit
wasting its resources? Is it encouraging appeals from the TTAB? Is
it improperly abrogating judicial power? Is it undermining the legit-
imacy of the TTAB in the eyes of litigants? Or does so difficult and
subjective a problem as likelihood of confusion require broad re-
view in order to serve justice? Whatever the answers, the questions
should be addressed.
105. Id. at 1074, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1904 (quoting Planter's Nut & Chocolate Co. v. Crown
Nut Co., 305 F.2d 916, 924-25, 134 U.S.P.Q. 504, 511 (C.C.P.A. 1962) which held that there
was likelihood of confusion regarding representations of Mr. Peanut's harmonized peanut).
. 106. The TTAB and Federal Circuit held that collateral estoppel did not apply "because
the [district] court did not determine the issue of likelihood of confusion with respect to any
of applicant's goods or services now before us [those other than belts and shoes]." Nina Ricc,
S.A.R.L, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1061, 1065 (T.T.A.B. 1988), rev'd, 889 F.2d 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1989). It
should be noted, however, that both the TTAB and CCPA have often determined that shoes
and other items of apparel are related goods for purposes of determining likelihood of confu-
sion. In re Pix of America, Inc., 225 U.S.P.Q. 691, 692 (T.T.A.B. 1985) (citing cases). The
same result is reached when belts and other items of apparel are considered. Justin Inc. v.
D.B. Rosenblatt, 213 U.S.P.A. 968, 976 (T.T.A.B. 1981).
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